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Abstract 
Using dynamic programming methodology, the paper analyzes the most general conditions for an additive utility 
functional to represent time consistent preferences. It challenges the conventional wisdom of the domain, which, 
following Strotz(1956), assume that only exponential discounting is compatible with time consistent behavior. The 
paper gives some examples of special time consistent hyperbolic discount functions and also discuss the relation 
between time consistency and stationarity.
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     1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relations between the important notions of
time consistency, stationarity and various sorts of parametrical discount functions (expo-
nential, hyperbolic, etc.). The notion of time consistency has been introduced by Strotz
(1956). To de¯ne properly this notion, it is important to distinguish (1) the calendar
date of decision (plani¯cation) (denoted t) and (2) the calendar date of the future act of
consumption (denoted s). The di®erence between those two dates is the algebraic time
distance of the future act of consumption according to the date of decision. The agent
will be time consistent if, in the absence of any new information, the choice of consump-
tion for any future calendar date is independent from the calendar date of decision. The
main result of Strotz (1956) is that, considering an additive intertemporal utility func-
tional, and considering a discount factor being a function of the algebraic time distance
(s-t), the agent will be time consistent, if and only if, the log derivative of the discount
factor is constant, i:e: the discount factor is exponential, and the discount rate is con-
stant. Strotz's methodology was to compare the solutions of continuous time programs
of intertemporal utility maximization under constraint solved at di®erent decision dates.
Strotz's notion of time consistency has proven to be seminal. From the empirical point of
view, following the work of psychologists (Ainslie (1975)) many evidence where collected
against the exponential discounting model (Thaler (1981), see Frederick et al. (2002) for
a survey). Even if there are still some debate (Harrison and Lau (2005) for example) the
idea of hyperbolic discounting, which is generally considered as implying time inconsis-
tent behavior, is now very standard in the experimental literature. We will see that this
implication is not true. From the theoretical point of view, following (Laibson (1997),
Harris and Laibson (2001), the notion of hyperbolic discounting has been used to explain
some irrational behavior as procrastination and under-savings (see Salani¶ e and Treich
(2006) for a discussion).
The notion of stationarity has been introduced by Koopmans (1960, 1972). If, for a
given decision date, the preference order between any two consumption streams is not
modi¯ed when those streams are anticipated or postponed by a same amount of time,
then the preference relation ful¯lls stationarity. It can be represented by an additive
intertemporal utility functional, with the same per "period utility function" for each cal-
endar date weighted by an exponential discount factor (i.e. a constant rate of discount).
Koopmans's methodology is fully axiomatic, and it provides strong foundations for the
exponential discounted utility model proposed by Samuelson (1937). Bleichrodt et al.
(2008) generalize and clarify Koopmans axiomatic methodology.
The two notions of time consistency and stationarity have been progressively melted in
a sort of conventional wisdom in the ¯eld of intertemporal choice. The claim of this paper
is that this conventional wisdom sometimes abusively sums up some results which do not
have the same domain of validity and have been established using di®erent methodologies.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 discussed the notion of time consistency
within the dynamic programming methodology (Strotz (1956)'s original methodology);
section 3 discuss the time consistency of some parametrical or semi parametrical discount
functions; and at last section 4 concludes.
12 Time consistent dynamic programming for a naive decision maker.
Let's denote the "calendar date of decision" as t. A consumer is endowed with an initial
capital, K(t) , and a planning horizon T. At every moment, this capital brings interest at
a constant rate, r and can be used to ¯nance consumption. We will consider Ct the set of
all functions c : [t;T] ¡! R+ continuous and derivable. We assume that the consumer's





with v, the "per period felicity function", continuous and derivable in c(s) and s, and
strictly concave in c(s). Taking s as a variable of the "per period felicity function" allows
us to include in the analysis the possibility of tastes evolving with age (non stationarity).
Taking t as a variable of the intertemporal utility functional allows us to include in the
analysis the possibility of changing taste at di®erent decision date. This speci¯cation is
thus the most general possible within the additive framework.








s:t:8s 2 [t;T]; _ K(s) = rK(s) ¡ c(s)
K(t) given and K(T) ¸ 0
Thus ct(s) is the optimal consumption at age s planed at date t (the value of the control
variable at age s) and Kt(s) =
R s
t (rK(¿)¡ct(¿))d¿ the remaining capital at age s for an
agent planing his consumption at date t (the value of the state variable at age s).
Let's now assume that at calendar date t0 2 (t;T), the consumer is allowed to plan
again his consumption for his remaining time. Following Strotz (1956), we will call the
consumer "naive" because when he plans his consumption at date t, he does not anticipate
in any way that he will be allowed to plan again at any subsequent date.
Keeping all assumptions made before, the choice of the consumer at date t0 is the








s:t:8s 2 [t0;T]; _ K(s) = rK(s) ¡ c(s)
K(t0) = Kt(t0) and K(T) ¸ 0
We now have all the material needed to de¯ne properly time consistency within the
dynamic programming approach. Our de¯nition is essentially the same as the one given
by Strotz (1956) in his seminal paper.
De¯nition 1. The agent is time consistent if and only if:
8t
0 2 [t;T];8s 2 [t
0;T];ct(s) = ct0(s) ´ c(s)
Within the set of utility functions de¯ned by Equation 1, what are the speci¯city of
the one compatible with time consistent behavior ?
Proposition 1. An agent is time consistent if and only if v is of the form:
v(c(s);s;t) = ®(t)w(c(s);s) + ¯(t) (2)
2Proof: It can easily be proven that the terminal constraint is binding (K(T) = 0)
for both programs and because of the strict concavity of v in c(s), ct and ct0 are both
unique. The dynamic constraint on the state variable are the same for the two programs











Moreover, using Pontryagin maximum principle it is easy to show that 8s 2 [t0;T], ¯rst
























If 8s; ct(s) = ct0(s) then we must have 8s; _ ct(s) = _ ct0(s). Proposition 1 is straightforward.
Proposition 1 is the most general statement concerning time consistency we can make
within the additive utility framework. As we can see, it is much more general than
standard claims concerning time consistency. In the next section we will discuss this
result according to special parametrical form of the discounted utility functional. But we
¯rst have to set some de¯nitions.












According to those de¯nitions we can rewrite the derivative of the optimal consump-





The slope of the planed consumption function is equal to the ratio of the di®erence be-
tween the market rate of discount (i:e: the rate of interest) and the generalized subjective
rate of discount, on one hand, with rate of absolute resistance to intertemporal substi-
tution, on the other hand. This result is a generalisation of the proposition of Yaari
(1964).
Corollary 1-a. The agent is time consistent if and only if the generalized subjective
rate of discount and the rate of absolute resistance to intertemporal substitution are both











At this point it is important to notice that the subjective rate of discount at a given
age has to be independent from the decision date, but not from the age. Constancy of
the subjective rate of discount is not a requisite for time consistency. We will discuss
further this point in the next section.
33 Time consistency and parametrical or semi-parametrical discount
functions
Since the seminal paper of Samuelson (1937), there is a tradition for separating the
discount factor and the "per period" utility. Within our general formulation it just means
that v is multiplicatively separable in c(s) i. e. v(c(s);s;t) = f(s;t)u(c(s)): Moreover we
can assume that the discount factor is a function of the algebraic time distance. In this
special case proposition 1 has strong implications.
Corollary 1-b (Exponential discounting model - Samuelson (1937)). If the intertemporal
utility functional takes the form V (c;t) =
R T
t f(s ¡ t)u(c(s))ds, with f a positive and
bounded function, then the agent is time consistent if and only if f(s¡t) = exp[¡µ(s¡t)].
In this special case £(c(t);s;t) = µ
Proposition 1 shows that time consistency implies that the "per period felicity func-
tion" is multiplicatively separable in t. Obviously, if the discount factor is a function
of the algebraic time distance, then time consistency implies that the discount factor is
necessarily exponential, because only exponential functions transform sums in products.
However if we adopt the more general formulation of the discounted utility model, we
get:
Corollary 1-c (Generalized discount factor - Burness (1976)). If the intertemporal utility
functional takes the form V (c;t) =
R T
t f(s;t)u(c(s))ds, with f a positive and bounded
function, then the agent is time consistent if and only if f(s;t) is multiplicatively separable
in s, i. e. f(s;t) = ®(s)¯(t)
Corollary 1-b characterizes the "conventional wisdom" in the domain. Corollary 1-c
shows that this "conventional wisdom" lacks of generality. Exponential discounting is
not a necessary condition for time consistency. Many examples can be given of time
consistent non-exponential discount function.






u(c(s))ds(with t > 0)
This intertemporal utility functional is "hyperbolic" because the discount factor is
an hyperbolic function. It implies time consistency because it satis¯es the conditions of
Proposition 1(and Corollary 1-c). The subjective rate of time preference £(s) = 1=s is
also hyperbolic and is independent from t (Corollary 1-a). Moreover, the discount factor
equals to one in t and decline with s (i.e. the agent shows decreasing impatience). In fact,
this special discount function was the one proposed in Ainslie (1975)'s seminal paper on
hyperbolic discounting, suggesting that general shape of this function what not too far
from the empirical ¯ndings of the author. Actually experimentalist use most of the time
other forms of hyperbolic or quasi hyperbolic discounting. But because they believe that
a decreasing rate of discount is a su±cient condition for time inconsistency, they don't
see the necessity to test functional form respecting the property of corollary 1-c against
more standard ones. The choice of this quite provocative example for giving the title of
this paper is precisely a call for more precise empirical investigation on this topic.






u(c(s))ds(with ± > 1)
In this second example we have seasonal e®ects. For example a consumer may value
less consumption in winter than in summer. Those intertemporal preferences are thus
characterized by cyclical discount rate and factor, and also cyclical consumption. Nev-
ertheless we ful¯ll the requirement of Proposition 1 (and Corollary 1-c) and thus an
individual endowed with such preferences will be time consistent.
The ¯rst demonstration of Corollary 1-b is generally attributed to Strotz (1956). But
Strotz's result was in fact slightly more general, because he was not assuming that the
"per period" utility function was invariant with age and thus not assuming stationarity
or a weaker hypothesis of that kind.
Corollary 1-d (Strotz (1956)). If the intertemporal utility functional takes the form
V (c;t) =
R T
t f(s ¡ t)u(c(s);s)ds, with f a positive and bounded function, then the agent
is time consistent if and only if f(s ¡ t) = exp[¡µ(s ¡ t)]
A lot has be written on that result. But it is important to notice that, writing
u(c(s);s) = w(c(s);s)exp[µs], Strotz's time consistent utility functional can be rewritten




proving that the exponential formulation was a mathematical artefact. There is a
kind of paradox here. Strotz's result was in fact very general. Rigorously, he demonstrates
that additivity is a su±cient condition for time consistency. But his formulation has
proven to be misleading in the sense that most of subsequent works on the question have
focused on the exponential formulation and forgotten the possible variability of the "per
period" utility function through time. More generally, the point here is that, as soon as
one works with an intertemporal utility functional with "per period" utility varying with
age, the discount function can no more be de¯ned in a unique fashion and thus becomes a
useless concept. However in this case our notion of generalized subjective rate of discount
remains valid and allows to discuss time preference, impatience, decreasing impatience
and many of the concepts that have been at stack in the recent years.
4 Conclusion
The idea that agents "behave rationally" is the corner stone of normative decision theory.
In the domain of intertemporal choice, time consistency is certainly the ultimate criteria
for characterizing rational behavior. For a long time, alternatives to the exponential
discounted utility model have been discarded because of the (false) belief that they where
incompatible with rational behavior. More recently, on the basis of experimental evidence
rejecting the exponential discounting model, many behavioral economist have claimed
that it was the proof that deviations from rationality were standard in the domain of
intertemporal choice. The objective of this note is certainly not to settle this debate.
Our only claim is that, if we want to go further on this question, we shall build on a
more solid ground. The exponential discounting is not the only one compatible with time
consistency. A non constant subjective rate of discounting does not necessarily imply
5non rational behavior. Even some kind of hyperbolic discounting may be compatible
with time consistency. Stationarity implies time consistency, but the reverse is not true.
It means in particular that stationarity (which implies that "per period utility function"
does not change with age) is a behavioral hypothesis that can be true or false, but it
is not a criteria of rationality. The huge domain of non exponential time consistent
intertemporal model of choice is still to be explored. Maybe it is time to begin.
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